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Abstract
Given a recursive ordinal Λ, the transfinite provability logic GLPΛ has
for each ξ < Λ a modality [ξ] with the intention of representing a sequence
of provability predicates of increasing strength. One possibility is to read
[ξ]φ as φ is provable in T using an ω-rule of depth ξ, where T is a second-
order theory extending ACA0.
In this paper we shall fomalize this notion in second-order arithmetic.
Our main results are that, under some fairly general conditions for T , the
logic GLPΛ is sound and complete for the resulting interpretation.
1 Introduction
One compelling and particularly successful interpretation of modal logic is to
think ofφ as the formula φ is provable, where provability is understood within a
formal theory T capable of coding syntax. This was suggested by Go¨del; indeed,
if we use ♦φ as a shorthand for ¬¬φ, the Second Incompleteness Theorem
could be written as ♦⊤ → ♦⊥. It took some time, however, for a complete
set of axioms to be assembled, namely until Lo¨b showed (φ→ φ) → φ to
be valid. It took longer still for the resulting calculus to be proven complete by
Solovay [12]. The resulting modal logic is called GL (for Go¨del-Lo¨b).
Later, Japaridze [10] enriched the language of GL by adding a sequence of
provability modalities [n], for n < ω. The modality [0] is now used as before
to state that φ is derivable within some fixed formal theory T , while higher
modalities represent provability in stronger and stronger theories. There are
many arithmetic interpretations for Japaridze’s logic, and one of them also
stems from an idea of Go¨del, who introduced the notion of a theory T being
ω-consistent: T is ω-consistent whenever for any formula φ, if T ⊢ φ(n¯) for all
n ∈ N, then T 0 ∃x¬φ(x). Dually to this notion one can define a notion of
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ω-provability: φ is ω-provable in T whenever T + ¬φ is ω-inconsistent. One
may then interpret [1]φ as φ is ω-provable; a detailed discussion of this is given
in Boolos [6].
One can then go on to interpret the higher modalities by using iterated ω-
rules. This idea was already explored by Japaridze and gives an interpretation
for which the polymodal logic GLPω is sound and complete; Ignatiev [9] and
Beklemishev [4] later improved on this result. This logic is much more powerful
than GL, and indeed Beklemishev has shown how it can be used to perform an
ordinal analysis of Peano Arithmetic and its natural subtheories [1].
Our (hyper)arithmetical interpretations will be a straightforward general-
ization of Japaridze’s where we read [α]Tφ as The formula φ is derivable in T
using ω-rules of nesting depth at most α; we shall make this precise later. We
do this by considering a well-ordering ≺ on the naturals and defining a logic
GLP≺. This is a variation of GLPΛ already studied by the authors and Beklem-
ishev [2, 8], with the sole difference that we shall represent ordinals as natural
numbers rather than appending them as external entities.
Our main result is that GLP≺ is sound and complete for arithmetical in-
terpretations on ‘suitable’ theories T ; we will mainly work with extensions of
ACA0, but as we shall discuss later, it is possible to work over a weaker base
theory.
Plan of the paper Section 2 gives a quick review of the logics GLP≺ as well
as their Kripke semantics, and Section 3 of second-order arithmetic. Section
4 formalizes the notion of iterated ω-provability in second-order arithmetic;
this notion is most naturally interpreted in introspective theories, introduced in
Section 5. Section 6 proves that GLP≺ is sound for our interpretation. In order
to prove completeness, Section 7 gives a brief review of the modal logic J, which
is used in the completeness proof provided in Section 8. Finally, Appendix B
discusses our choice of base theory and Appendix A possible variations on the
notion of iterated ω-provability.
2 The logic GLP≺
Formulas of the language L[·] are built from ⊥ and countably many propositional
variables p ∈ P using Boolean connectives ¬,∧ and a modality [ξ] for each
natural number ξ. As is customary, we use 〈ξ〉 as a shorthand for ¬[ξ]¬.
If ≺ is a binary relation on the naturals, the logic GLP≺ is given by the
following rules and axioms:
1. all propositional tautologies,
2. [ξ](φ→ ψ)→ ([ξ]φ→ [ξ]ψ) for all ξ,
3. [ξ]([ξ]φ→ φ)→ [ξ]φ for all ξ,
4. 〈ζ〉φ→ 〈ξ〉φ for ξ ≺ ζ,
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5. 〈ξ〉φ→ [ζ] 〈ξ〉φ for ξ ≺ ζ,
6. Modus Ponens, Substitution and Necessitation:
φ
[ξ]φ
.
We will normally be interested in the case where ≺ is a well-order, in which case
it is known that 〈ξ〉⊤ is consistent with GLP≺ for all ξ (see [8]). In case ≺ is a
recursive well-order of order-type Λ we shall often write GLPΛ instead of GLP≺
making the necessary definitional changes for finite order types Λ.
We shall also work with Kripke semantics. A Kripke frame is a structure
F =
〈
W, 〈Ri〉i<I
〉
, where W is a set and 〈Ri〉i<I a family of binary relations on
W . A valuation on F is a function J·K : L[·] → P(W ) such that
J⊥K = ∅
J¬φK = W \ JφK
Jφ ∧ ψK = JφK ∩ JψK
J〈i〉φK = R−1i JφK .
A Kripke model is a Kripke frame equipped with a valuation J·K. Note that
propositional variables may be assigned arbitrary subsets of W . Clearly, a valu-
ation is uniquely determined once we have fixed its values for the propositional
variables. As usual, φ is satisfied on 〈F, J·K〉 if JφK 6= ∅, and valid on 〈F, J·K〉 if
JφK = W .
It is well-known that polymodal GL is sound for F whenever R−1i is well-
founded and transitive, in which case we write R−1i as <i. However, construct-
ing models of GLPΛ is substantially more difficult than constructing models of
GL, since the full logic GLPΛ is not sound and complete for any class of Kripke
frames. In Section 7 we will circumvent this problem by working in Beklemi-
shev’s J, a slightly weaker logic that is complete for a manageable class of Kripke
frames.
3 Second-order arithmetic
Aside from the modal language L[·], we will work mainly in the language L
2
∀ of
second-order arithmetic.
We fix some primitive recursive Go¨del numbering mapping a formula ψ ∈ L2∀
to its corresponding Go¨del number pψq, and similarly for terms and sequents of
formulas (used to represent derivations). Moreover, we fix some set of numerals
which are terms so that each natural number n is denoted by exactly one numeral
written as n. Since we will be working mainly inside theories of arithmetic, we
will often identify ψ with pψq or even with pψq for that matter.
Our results are not very sensitive to the specific choice of primitive sym-
bols; however, to simplify notation, we will assume we have the following terms
available:
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1. A term 〈x, y〉 which returns a code of the ordered pair formed by x and y.
2. A term x[y/z] which, when x codes a formula φ, y a variable v and z a
term t, returns the code of the result of subsituting t for v in φ. Otherwise,
its value is unspecified, for example it could be the default p⊥q. We shall
often just write φ(t) for this term if the context allows us to.
3. A term x → y which, when x, y are codes for φ, ψ, returns a code of
φ → ψ, and similarly for other Boolean operators or quantifiers. The
context should always clarify if we use the symbol → as a term or as a
logical connective.
4. A term x mapping a natural number to the code of its numeral.
5. For every formula φ, a term φ(x˙) which, given a natural number n, returns
the code of the outcome of φ[x/n¯], i.e., the code of φ(n).
We will also use this notation in the metalanguage. The only purpose of
assuming these terms exist is to shorten complex formulas, as the graphs of all
these functions are definable by low level arithmetic formulas over most standard
arithmetic languages.
As is customary, we use ∆00 to denote the set of all formulas (possibly with set
parameters) where all quantifiers are “bounded”, that is, of the form ∀x < y φ
or ∃x < y φ. We simultaneously define Σ00 = Π
0
0 = ∆
0
0 and Σ
0
n+1 to be the set
of all formulas of the form ∃x0 . . . ∃xnφ with φ ∈ Π
0
n and similarly Π
0
n+1 to be
the set of all formulas of the form ∀x0 . . . ∀xnφ with φ ∈ Σ
0
n. We denote by Π
0
ω
the union of all Π0n; these are the arithmetic formulas.
The classes Σ1n,Π
1
n are defined analogously but using second-order quantifiers
and setting Σ10 = Π
1
0 = ∆
1
0 = Π
0
ω. It is well-known that every second-order
formula is equivalent to another in one of the above forms. If Γ is a set of
formulas, we denote by Γˆ the subset of Γ where no set variables appear free.
We will say a theory T is representable if there is a ∆ˆ00 formula ProofT (x, y)
which holds if and only if x codes a derivation in T of a formula coded by y; in
general we assume all theories to be representable. We may also assume without
loss of generality that any derivation d is a derivation of a unique formula φ, for
example by representing d as a finite sequence of formulas whose last element
is φ. Also, we assume that every formula that is derivable has arbitrarily large
derivations; this is generally true of standard proof systems, for example one may
add many copies of an unused axiom or many redundant cuts. Whenever it does
not lead to confusion we will work directly with codes rather than formulas; if φ
is a natural number (supposedly coding a formula) we use Tφ as a shorthand
for ∃y ProofT (y, φ).
It is important in this paper to keep track of the second-order principles that
are used; below we describe the most important ones. We use < to denote the
standard ordering on the naturals and Γ denotes some set of formulas:
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Γ-CA ∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ φ(x)) where φ ∈ Γ;
I-Γ φ(0) ∧ ∀x(φ(x)→ φ(x + 1))→ ∀xφ(x) where φ ∈ Γ;
Ind ∀x(∀ y<xy ∈ X → x ∈ X)→ ∀xx∈X .
We assume all theories extend two-sorted first-order logic, so that they include
Modus Ponens, Generalization, etc., as well as Robinson’s Arithmetic, i.e. Peano
Arithmetic without induction.
Another principle that will be relevant to us is transfinite recursion, but this
is a bit more elaborate to describe. For simplicity let us assume that L2∀ contains
only monadic set-variables; binary relations and functions can be represented
by coding pairs of numbers. It will be convenient to establish a few conventions
for working with binary relations in second-order arithmetic. First, let us write
R is a binary relation and f is a function:
rel(R) = ∀x
(
x ∈ R→ ∃y∃z
(
x = 〈y, z〉
))
,
funct(f) = rel(f) ∧ ∀x∃!y(〈x, y〉 ∈ f).
Here, ∃! is the standard abbreviation for there exists a unique.
Also for simplicity, we may write n R m if R represents a relation and
〈n,m〉 ∈ R as well as n 6R m for ¬(〈n,m〉 ∈ R), or n = f(m) if 〈m,n〉 ∈ f and
f is meant to be interpreted as a function. Further, it is possible to work with
a second-order equality symbol, but it suffices to define X ≡ Y by ∀x(x ∈ X ↔
y ∈ Y ).
It will also be important to represent ordinals in second-order arithmetic.
For this we will reserve a set-variable ≺. Here, we will need to express the rela-
tion ≺ is a linear order and the relation ≺ is well-ordered, as follows:
linear(≺) :
∀x
(
¬(x ≺ x) ∧ ∀y(x ≺ y ∨ y ≺ x ∨ y = x)
)
∧ ∀x, y, z (x≺y ∧ y≺z → x≺z);
wo(≺) :
linear(≺) ∧ ∀X
(
∃x(x ∈ X)→ ∃y∀z
(
z ≺ y → ¬(z ∈ X)
))
.
We will use Greek letters for natural numbers when viewed as ordered under ≺.
When it is clear from context we may use natural numbers to represent finite
ordinals, so that, for example, 0 is the least element under ≺, independently of
whether it truly corresponds to the natural number zero.
We shall often want that the elementary properties of ≺ be provable, for
example,
ξ ≺ ζ → T ξ ≺ ζ.
This can be guaranteed if we work with recursive well-orders, in which case
we assume T contains an axiom ∀x, y (x ≺ y ↔ σ(x, y)) for some Σˆ01 formula
σ(x, y).
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Transfinite recursion is the principle that sets may be defined by iterating
a formula along a well-order. To formalize this, let us consider a set X whose
elements are of the form 〈ξ, x〉. Write Xξ for {x | 〈ξ, x〉 ∈ X} and X≺ξ for
{x | ∃ ζ≺ξ 〈ζ, x〉 ∈ X}. Then, given a set of formulas Γ we define
TR-Γ wo(≺)→ ∃X∀ξ∀x
(
x ∈ Xξ ↔ φ(x,X≺ξ)
)
for φ ∈ Γ.
With this, we may define the following systems of arithmetic:
RCA0 := I-Σ
0
1 + ∆
0
0-CA
ACA0 := Ind + Π
0
ω-CA
ATR0 := Ind + TR-Π
0
ω.
We list these from weakest to strongest, but even ATR0 is fairly weak in the
realm of second-order arithmetic. For convenience we will work mainly in ACA0,
but later discuss how our techniques could be pushed down even to below RCA0
at the cost of slightly stronger transfinite induction.
The system ATR0 is relevant because we will define iterated provability by
recursion over the well-order ≺. However, as we shall see, we require much less
than the full power of arithmetic transfinite recursion.
In various proofs we wish to reason by transfinite induction. By TI(≺, φ) we
denote the transfinite induction axiom for φ along the ordering ≺:
TI(≺, φ) := ∀ξ (∀ ζ≺ξ φ(ζ)→ φ(ξ))→ ∀ξφ(ξ).
We will write φ-CA instead of {φ}-CA, i.e., the instance of the comprehension
axiom stating that {x | φ(x)} is a set. The following lemma tells us that we
have access to transfinite induction for formulas of the right complexity:
Lemma 3.1. In any second order arithmetic theory containing predicate logic
we can prove
wo(≺) ∧ ¬φ-CA→ TI(≺, φ).
Proof. Reason in T and assume wo(≺) ∧ ¬φ-CA. We prove TI(≺, φ) by contra-
position. Thus, suppose that ∃λ¬φ(γ). As {ξ | ¬φ(ξ)} is a set, we can apply
wo(≺) to obtain the minimal such λ. Clearly for this minimal λ we do not have
∀ ζ≺λ φ(ζ)→ φ(λ).
4 Nested ω-rules
In this section we shall formalize the notion of iterated ω-rules inside second-
order arithmetic. In Boolos ([6]) it is noted that multiple parallel applications
of the ω-rule do not add extra strength. For example, the rule that allows us to
conclude σ from
∀n ⊢ ψ(n)
∀m ⊢ ∀xψ(x)→ φ(m)
⊢ ∀xφ(x) → σ
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can actually be derived by a single application of the ω rule.
However, when we admit slightly less uniformity by allowing ψ to depend
on m in this rule, and adding the premises ∀n ⊢ ψm(n) we get our notion of 2-
provability. More generally, we may iterate this process to generate a hierarchy
or stronger and stronger notions of ξ-provability for a recursive ordinal ξ. It is
the nesting depth that gives extra strength and not the number of applications.
We will use [λ]≺T φ to denote our representation of The formula φ is provable
in T using one application of an ω-rule of depth λ (according to ≺). The desired
recursion for such a sequence of provability predicates is given by the following
equivalence.1
[λ]≺T φ ↔
(
Tφ ∨ ∃ψ ∃ ξ≺λ
(
∀n [ξ]≺T ψ(n˙) ∧ T (∀xψ(x)→ φ)
))
. (1)
As a first step in such a formalization, we will use a set X as an ‘iterated prov-
ability class’ IPC for short. Its elements are codes of pairs 〈λ, φ〉, with λ a code
for an ordinal and φ a code for a formula; we use [λ]Xφ as a shorthand for
〈λ, φ〉 ∈ X and 〈λ〉Xφ for 〈λ,¬φ〉 6∈ X . Clearly, any IPC will depend on a pa-
rameter ≺ whose intended interpretation is a well-ordering on the naturals. We
then define a formula IPC≺T (X) (‘iterated provability class’) as a formalization of:
[λ]Xφ if and only if
1. λ = 0 and Tφ, or
2. there is a formula ψ(x) and an ordinal ξ ≺ λ such that
(a) for each n < ω, [ξ]Xψ(n), and
(b) T (∀xψ(x)→ φ).
Intuitively, we understand IPC≺T (X) as stating “X is an iterated provability
predicate” and in the remainder of this text we will use both ‘class’ or ‘predicate’
to refer to IPCs. Let us enter in a bit more detail:
Definition 4.1. Define Rule≺T (λ, φ | X) by
∃ψ ∃ ξ≺λ
(
∀n [ξ]Xψ(n˙) ∧T (∀xψ(x)→ φ)
)
and let IPC≺T (X) be the formula
∀z
[
z ∈ X ↔ ∃λ∃φ
(
z = 〈λ, φ〉 ∧ (Tφ ∨ Rule
≺
T (λ, φ | X)
)]
.
Then, [λ]≺T φ is the Π
1
1-formula ∀X(IPC
≺
T (X)→ [λ]Xφ).
1There are other reasonable ways of defining this recursion. In Appendix A, we shall
discuss some possible alternatives.
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Note that the formulas [λ]Xφ and 〈λ〉Xφ are independent of T and of ≺ and
are merely of complexity ∆00. Note also that for r.e. theories T we have that
Rule≺T (λ, φ | X) is a Σ
0
2-formula whence IPC
≺
T (X) is a Π
0
3-formula. We can write
the definition of IPC≺T (X) more succinctly as
IPC≺T (X) ↔ ∀ξ, φ
(
[ξ]Xφ ↔
(
Tφ ∨ Rule
≺
T (ξ, φ | X)
))
.
From the definition of our provability predicates we easily obtain monotonicity:
Lemma 4.2. Given theories U, T where U extends ACA0 and T is repre-
sentable, we have that
U ⊢ (ξ ≺ ζ)→ ([ξ]≺T φ→ [ζ]
≺
T φ).
Proof. We reason within U . Suppose [ξ]≺T φ holds as well as IPC
≺
T (X). Letting x
be any variable not appearing in φ we have that [ξ]Xφ(n¯) holds for all n < ω as
well as T (∀xφ→ φ). Thus, [ζ]Xφ and, since X was arbitrary, [ζ]
≺
T φ holds.
Corollary 4.3. Let U and T be as in Lemma 4.2. If T ⊢ φ, then T ⊢ [λ]≺T φ.
Proof. If T ⊢ φ then Tφ is a true Σˆ
0
1 sentence whence U ⊢ Tφ. Thus also
U ⊢ [0]≺T φ and by monotonicity (Lemma 4.2), we get U ⊢ [λ]
≺
T φ.
Our notion of ξ-provability, [ξ]≺T , is a very weak one as it has a universal
quantification over all provability predicates X and it may be the case that
there are no such predicates. Dually, the notion of consistency 〈ξ〉≺T is very
strong as it in particular asserts the existence of a provability predicate. In
particular, we always provably have
Tφ→ [0]
≺
T φ. (2)
However, we can in general not prove [0]≺T φ → Tφ. Nevertheless, the two
notions of provability coincide under the assumption that a provability predicate
exists:
Lemma 4.4. Given a representable theory T and a theory U that extends ACA0
we have
U ⊢ ∃XIPC≺T (X)→ (Tφ ↔ [0]
≺
T φ).
Proof. The proof is straightforward and is left to the reader.
In the field of formalized provability one often uses formalized Σ01 complete-
ness (see e.g. [6]):
Lemma 4.5. Let T be some representable arithmetic theory with induction for
all ∆ˆ00 formulas (i.e., ∆
0
0 without free set variables) and where exponentiation
is provably total. Let σ be a Σˆ01 formula. We have
T ⊢ σ → Tσ.
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Of course, it makes really no sense to speak of provable Σ01 completeness
where we allow free set variables. In particular we cannot apply it to our notion
[0]Xφ, which is why Lemma 4.4 will often be useful.
A useful fact is that [λ]≺T φ is well-defined in the following sense:
Lemma 4.6. Given theories U, T where U extens ACA0 and T is representable,
we have that U proves
wo(≺)→ ∀X∀Y
(
IPC≺T (X) ∧ IPC
≺
T (Y )→ ∀x (x∈X ↔ x∈Y )
)
.
Proof. This follows by a simple induction over ≺.
Moreover, under the assumption of wo(≺) we can also show a useful mono-
tonicity property of our provability predicates.
Lemma 4.7. Let U be some theory extending ACA0 and let T and T
′ be rep-
resentable theories. Write T ⊆ T ′ as a shorthand for ∀φ Tφ→ T ′φ.
Then,
U + wo(≺) ⊢ T ⊆ T ′ → ([λ]≺T φ→ [λ]
≺
T ′φ).
Proof. Reason in U + wo(≺) and assume that T ⊆ T ′. By an easy induction on
λ it is shown that if both IPC≺T (X) and IPC
≺
T ′(X
′), then 〈λ, φ〉 ∈ X → 〈λ, φ〉 ∈
X ′.
5 Introspective theories
For a theory T to be able to reason about non-trivial facts of iterated provability
at all, it is necessary for it to at least “believe” that such a notion exists. For
strong theories this is not an issue, but there is no reason to assume that ACA0
or any weaker theory is capable of proving that we have provability predicates.
Hence we shall pay attention to those theories that do have them, and we shall
call them introspective theories.
Definition 5.1 (Introspective theory). An arithmetic theory T is ≺-introspective
if T ⊢ ∃XIPC≺T (X).
We defined provability operators by transfinite recursion, and as such it
should be no surprise that ATR0 is introspective:
Lemma 5.2. Given an elementarily presented theory T ,
ATR0 ⊢ wo(≺)→ ∃XIPC
≺
T (≺, X).
In particular, ATR0 is introspective.
However, we wish to work over much weaker theories than ATR0, which
may not be introspective. Our strategy will be to consider some sort of an
“introspective closure”, but do not wish for it to become much stronger than
the original theory. Fortunately, this is not too difficult to achieve.
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Definition 5.3. We define the ≺-introspective closure of T as the theory T
given by T + ∃XIPC≺T (X).
Below, we use the term “Go¨delian” somewhat informally as being susceptible
to Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem; for example, it could be taken to
mean sound, representable and extending RCA0.
Lemma 5.4. T is equiconsistent with T , provided T is Go¨delian and contains
∆ˆ00 comprehension.
Proof. Clearly the consistency of T implies the consistency of T . For the other
direction we use that if T is Go¨delian, then T is equiconsistent with T ′ :=
T +T⊥. We claim that T
′ ⊢ ∃XIPC≺T (X) so that T
′ ⊇ T whence
Con(T ) ⇒ Con(T ′)
⇒ Con(T ).
Indeed, reasoning within T , if T were inconsistent, then Tφ for every for-
mula φ. It follows that if X is an iterated provability operator, then [λ]Xφ
for all λ and φ; hence the trivial set consisting of all pairs 〈λ, φ〉 is an iterated
provability operator, and by ∆ˆ00 comprehension, it forms a set.
There is still a danger of sliding down a slippery-slope, where T is itself
not introspective, thus needing to generate a sequence of theories that is each
“introspective over the previous”. Fortunately, this is not the case. In order to
show this we need a technical lemma reminiscent of the Deduction Theorem.
Definition 5.5. Let X be an iterated provability operator, so that IPC≺T (X)
holds. We define the set X given θ –which we denote by {X |θ}– as
〈λ, φ〉 ∈ {X |θ} :⇐⇒ 〈λ, θ → φ〉 ∈ X.
The technical lemma that we shall now prove tells us in particular that
introspection is preserved under taking finite extensions.
Lemma 5.6. Let U be some theory containing ∆00 comprehension, and let T be
representable. Then
U ⊢ IPC≺T (Y )→ IPC
≺
T+θ({Y |θ}).
Proof. We reason in U and assume IPC≺T (Y ). By ∆
0
0 comprehension we see that
{Y |θ} is a set. We need to show that [λ]{Y |θ}φ↔ T+θφ∨Rule
≺
T+θ(λ, φ | {Y |θ}).
Since
[λ]{Y |θ}φ ↔ [λ]Y (θ → φ)
↔ T (θ → φ) ∨ Rule
≺
T (λ, θ → φ | Y ),
and since T+θφ ↔ T (θ → φ), it suffices to show Rule
≺
T+θ(λ, φ | {Y |θ}) ↔
Rule≺T (λ, θ → φ | Y ).
But this follows easily from the tautology(
θ → (∀xψ(x)→ φ)
)
↔
(
∀x (θ → ψ(x))→ (θ → φ)
)
and the definition of {Y |θ}.
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As a direct consequence of this lemma we see that the introspective closure
of a theory is indeed itself introspective.
Lemma 5.7. Using ∆00 comprehension one can show that T is introspective.
Proof. By the above Lemma 5.6, if Y is a provability predicate for T , then
{Y |∃XIPC≺T (X)} is a provability predicate for T . Moreover, by ∆
0
0 comprehen-
sion, it forms a set.
We conclude that working with introspective theories is not too restrictive:
Corollary 5.8. Every Go¨delian theory T is equiconsistent to an introspective
theory T .
Note that in general we may not expect for U to prove ∃XIPC≺T+θ(X) →
∃XIPC≺T (X) since for θ = T⊥ the antecedent always holds (recall the proof of
Lemma 5.4).
A problem that T has is that it introduces an existential second-order for-
mula, which may make it hard later to control the complexity of the resulting
theory. Because of this, it is sometimes more convenient to work with explicitly
introspective theories:
Definition 5.9. Given a formal theory T , we define T pi over the language
L2∀ + {π}, where π is a new set-constant and T
pi = T + IPC≺T (π).
Much as with T , T pi is introspective, provided T contains ∆00 comprehension.
In fact, we can do a bit better in this case. Recall that, given a class of formulas
Γ, Γˆ denotes the set of those formulas of Γ with no open set variables; excluding
π, of course, which is a constant. Then we have the following:
Lemma 5.10. Using ∆ˆ00 comprehension one can prove that T
pi is introspective.
The proof proceeds as before and we omit it. Parameter-free comprehension
is very convenient in that it does not “blow up”, as it cannot be iterated; for
example, Π01 comprehension with set parameters is equivalent to full arithmetic
comprehension, but Πˆ01 comprehension is not.
Now that we have shown that introspective theories are not such a bad thing
to work with, we will employ them freely in the next sections. Introspective the-
ories are capable of reasoning about their own iterated provability; for example,
we may prove the desired recursion as stated in (1).
Lemma 5.11. Let T be a theory that extends ACA0. Then, we have that
1. T ⊢
(
Tφ ∨ ∃ψ ∃ ξ≺λ
(
∀n [ξ]≺T ψ(n˙) ∧ T (∀xψ(x)→ φ)
))
→ [λ]≺T φ;
2. T ⊢ [λ]≺T φ ↔
(
Tφ ∨ ∃ψ ∃ ξ≺λ
(
∀n [ξ]≺T ψ(n˙) ∧ T (∀xψ(x)→ φ)
))
.
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Proof. In the first item, we reason in T and need to prove [λ]≺T φ under the
assumption of the antecedent. To this end, we fix some X with IPC≺T (X) and
show [λ]Xφ. However, this follows directly from the definition of X being a
provability predicate since we can replace ∀n [ξ]≺T ψ(n˙) in the antecedent by
∀n [ξ]Xψ(n˙).
For the remaining implication in the second item we reason as follows. In
case λ = 0 we get the implication by Lemma 4.4. In case λ > 0, from the
definition we see that for any provability predicate X we have
[λ]Xφ →
(
Tφ ∨ ∃ψ ∃ ξ≺λ
(
∀n [ξ]Xψ(n˙) ∧ T (∀xψ(x)→ φ)
))
.
From this we obtain
[λ]≺T φ→ ∀X
[
IPC≺T (X)→(
Tφ ∨ ∃ψ∃ξ≺λ
(
∀n [ξ]Xψ(n˙) ∧T (∀xψ(x)→ φ)
))]
,
from which the claim directly follows.
6 Soundness
In this section we shall see that indeed GLP≺ is sound for its arithmetic interpre-
tation. In Lemma 4.2 we have already seen the soundness of the monotonicity
axiom [ξ]φ → [ζ]φ for ξ ≺ ζ. For the remaining axioms we will transfinite in-
duction over ≺ so we define, given a second-order theory T , a new theory T≺
as
T≺ := T + wo(≺).
We will assume that T contains ACA0, although in Appendix B we shall discuss
this choice. Since introspection is closed under taking finite extensions both
T
≺
and T≺ are introspective (though not necessarily equivalent); for all our
arguments below it is irrelevant which one we use.
Let us first check the soundness of the basic distribution axiom.
Lemma 6.1. Given theories U, T where U extends ACA0 and T is repre-
sentable, then
U≺ ⊢ [λ]≺T (φ1 → φ2)→ ([λ]
≺
T φ1 → [λ]
≺
T φ2).
Proof. We reason within U≺.
Let X be a provability predicate. We shall prove by induction on λ that
∀φ1, φ2
(
[λ]Xφ1 ∧ [λ]X(φ1 → φ2)→ [λ]Xφ2
)
. (3)
Note that by Lemma 3.1 we only need Σ01 comprehension (with set parameters)
to have access to this transfinite induction.
So, we assume that [λ]Xφ1 ∧ [λ]X(φ1 → φ2) and let ψ1, ψ2 be such that
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1. for each i = 1, 2 there is ξi < λ such that for all n < ω, 〈ξi, ψi(n)〉 ∈ X ,
2. T (∀xψ1(x)→ φ1),
3. T (∀xψ2(x)→ (φ1 → φ2)).
By first-order logic we see that
T (∀x(ψ1(x) ∧ ψ2(x))→ φ2). (4)
Let ξ = max{ξ1, ξ2}. By induction on ξ ≺ λ and several uses of Modus
Ponens inside [ξ]X we obtain for each n that [ξ]X(ψ1(n) ∧ ψ2(n)). But given
that X is an IPC, this shows in combination with (4) that [λ]Xφ2 and we have
shown (3).
To conclude the proof, we assume that [λ]≺T (φ1 → φ2) ∧ [λ]
≺
T φ1. Thus, for
an arbitrary provability predicate X we have [λ]X(φ1 → φ2) ∧ [λ]Xφ1 whence
by (3) also [λ]Xφ2. As X was arbitrary, we obtain [λ]
≺
T φ2.
With our distribution axiom at hand we can now obtain a formalized De-
duction Theorem.
Lemma 6.2. Let U be a theory extending ACA0 and let T be representable.
We have that
U≺ ⊢ [λ]≺T+θφ↔ [λ]
≺
T (θ → φ).
Proof. If [λ]≺T (θ → φ) then, by Lemma 4.7 we also have [λ]
≺
T+θ(θ → φ). Since
clearly [λ]≺T+θθ, by the distribution axiom we get [λ]
≺
T+θφ.
For the other direction, reason in U≺ and assume [λ]≺T+θφ. Let X be
arbitrary with IPC≺T (X). By Lemma 5.6 we see that IPC
≺
T+θ({X |θ}). Now
by the assumption that [λ]≺T+θφ we see that [λ]{X|θ}φ so that consequently
[λ]X(θ → φ).
So far we have shown that some of the axioms of GLP≺ are sound for our
omega-rule interpretation; Lo¨b’s axiom and the “provable consistency” axiom
remain to be checked. For the former, the following lemma will be quite useful.
Lemma 6.3. Extend GL with a new operator  and the following axioms for
all formulas φ, and ψ:
1. ⊢ φ→ φ,
2. ⊢ (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ) and,
3. ⊢ φ→ φ,
and call the resulting system GL.
Then for all φ,
GL
 ⊢ (φ→ φ)→ φ.
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Proof. It is well-known that GL is equivalent to K4 plus the Lo¨b Rule:
φ→ φ
φ
.
Thus it suffices to check that this rule holds for . But indeed, assume that
GL
 ⊢ φ → φ. Then, using φ → φ we obtain φ → φ, and by Lo¨b’s rule
(for ) we see that GL ⊢ φ, as desired.
Thus to show that [λ]≺T is Lo¨bian for all λ, we need only show the following:
Lemma 6.4. Given a recursive order ≺, theories U, T where U extends ACA0
and T is representable, we have that
U≺ ⊢ ∀φ∀λ [λ]≺T φ→ [λ]
≺
T [λ˙]
≺
T φ˙.
Proof. Reason within U≺. We assume IPC≺T (X) and will show by induction on
≺ that if [λ]Xφ, then [λ]X [λ¯]
≺
T φ¯, from which the lemma clearly follows.
The base case, when λ=0, is straightforward. We assume [0]Xφ and by
Lemma 4.4 we get Tφ whence TT φ¯ by provable Σˆ
0
1-completeness of U .
Consequently, by applying (2) twice (once under the box) we obtain [0]≺T [0¯]
≺
T φ¯
whence certainly also [0]X [0¯]
≺
T φ¯.
Now assume that λ ≻ 0 and there are ξ ≺ λ and ψ such that for all n,
[ξ]Xψ(n) and T (∀xψ(x)→ φ).
By the induction hypothesis on ξ ≺ λ, for every number n we can see that
[ξ]X [ξ¯]
≺
T ψ¯(n¯). Thus we obtain by one application of the ω-rule that
[λ]X∀n[ξ¯]
≺
T ψ¯(n˙). (5)
Meanwhile, we have that [0]XT (∀xψ¯(x) → φ¯) from which it follows by
monotonicity that
[λ]XT (∀xψ¯(x)→ φ¯). (6)
Since ≺ is recursive we also have that
[λ]X ξ¯ ≺ λ¯. (7)
Putting (5), (6) and (7) together and bringing the existential quantifiers under
the box we conclude that
[λ]X
(
∃ψ ∃ ξ≺λ
(
∀n[ξ]≺T ψ(n˙) ∧T (∀xψ(x)→ φ)
))
.
By an application under the box of Lemma 5.11.1 (note that no need of intro-
spection is required) we obtain [λ]X [λ¯]
≺
T φ¯ as was to be proven.
In the proof of the remaining GLP≺ axiom we will need for the first and only
time the assumption that T is introspective.
Lemma 6.5. If U is any theory extending ACA0, ≺ is recursive and T is
representable and ≺-introspective, then
U≺ ⊢ ∀φ∀λ∀ξ ≺ λ 〈ξ〉≺T φ→ [λ]
≺
T 〈ξ˙〉
≺
T φ˙.
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Proof. We reason in U≺ and assume that ξ ≺ λ. Let us first see that it is
sufficient to show that for an arbitrary provability predicateX we have 〈ξ〉Xφ→
[λ]X〈ξ¯〉
≺
T φ¯.
If we wish to show [λ]≺T 〈ξ¯〉
≺
T φ¯ we pick an arbitrary provability predicate X
and set out to prove [λ]X〈ξ¯〉
≺
T φ¯. By the assumption 〈ξ〉
≺
T φ we know that there
is some provability predicate Y with 〈ξ, φ〉 /∈ Y , that is, 〈ξ〉Y φ. By Lemma 4.6,
we have that X ≡ Y , whence 〈ξ〉Xφ and indeed, 〈ξ〉Xφ→ [λ]X〈ξ¯〉
≺
T φ¯ suffices to
finish the proof.
In view of the above, we will prove 〈ξ〉Xφ → [λ]X〈ξ¯〉
≺
T φ¯ by induction on λ.
For the base case, when λ = 1, we reason as follows. From 〈0〉Xφ, we obtain
the Πˆ01 sentence ♦Tφ, that is, ∀n¬ProofT (n, φ¯). Since ¬ProofT (n, φ¯) ∈ Σˆ
0
1, we
get ∀n T¬ProofT (n˙, φ¯) and also ∀n [0]
≺
T ¬ProofT (n˙, φ¯). Then by applying an
ω-rule we see that [1]X♦Tφ. Since T is ≺-introspective then [1]X∃Y IPC
≺
T (Y ),
and by Lemma 4.4
[1]X
(
∃Y IPC≺T (Y )→ (〈0¯〉
≺
T φ¯↔ ♦T φ¯)
)
,
from which we conclude that [1]X〈0¯〉
≺
T φ¯.
So assume that λ ≻ 1. If we have that 〈ξ〉Xφ then for every formula ψ either
1. for all η ≺ ξ there is n < ω such that 〈η〉X¬ψ(n), or
2. ♦T (∀xψ(x) ∧ φ) holds.
In the first case, by the induction hypothesis for ξ ≺ λ we can see that
∃n [ξ]X〈η¯〉
≺
T ¬ψ¯(n¯); in the second, we have that [ξ]X♦T (∀xψ¯(x) ∧ φ). Combining
these, we obtain
η ≺ ξ → [ξ]X
(
∃x〈η¯〉≺T ¬ψ¯(x˙) ∨ ♦T (∀xψ¯(x) ∧ φ¯)
)
.
Since ≺ is recursive, we know that η < ξ → [ξ]X η¯ < ξ¯. We thus see that, for all
pairs 〈η, ψ〉,
[ξ]X
(
η¯ < ξ¯ ∨ ∃x〈η¯〉≺T ¬ψ¯(x˙) ∨ ♦T (∀xψ¯(x) ∧ φ¯)
)
.
By one application of the ω-rule to all pairs 〈η, ψ〉 (represented as natural
numbers) we obtain
[λ]X
(
∀ψ∀η ≺ ξ
(
∃x〈η〉≺T ¬ψ(x˙) ∨ ♦T (∀xψ˙(x) ∧ φ¯)
))
,
and by definition (Lemma 5.11.1 applied under the box) we get [λ]X〈ξ¯〉
≺
T φ¯.
We have essentially proven that GLP≺ is sound for its omega-rule interpre-
tation, but we need the following definition in order to make this claim precise.
Definition 6.6. An arithmetic interpretation is a function f : P→ L2∀.
We denote by f≺T the unique extension of f such that f
≺
T (p) = f(p) for
every propositional variable p, f≺T (⊥) = ⊥, f
≺
T commutes with Booleans and
f≺T ([λ]φ) = [λ¯]
≺
T f
≺
T (φ).
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Theorem 6.7 (Soundness). If ≺ is any recursive well-order on the naturals, U
is a sound theory extending ACA0, T is ≺-introspective and representable and
GLP≺ ⊢ φ then U
≺ ⊢ f≺T (φ) for every arithmetic interpretation f .
Proof. By an easy induction on the length of a GLP≺-proof of φ, using the fact
that each of the axioms is derivable. Necessitation is just Corollary 4.3.
Now that we have proven that GLP≺ is sound, our main objective will be to
prove the converse of Theorem 6.7 which is hyper-arithmetical completeness of
GLP≺. For this, let us first review the modal logic J.
7 The logic J
It is well-known that GLPΛ has no non-trivial Kripke frames for Λ > 1. In order
to remedy for this situation, we pass to a weaker logic, Beklemishev’s J. The
logic J is as GLPω where we replace the monotonicity axiom of GLPω by the two
axioms
6. [n]→ [m][n]φ, for n ≤ m and
7. [n]→ [n][m]φ, for n < m.
The logic J is proven in [3] to be sound and complete for the class of finite
Kripke models 〈W, 〈>n〉n<N , J·K〉 such that
1. the relations <n are transitive and well-founded,
2. if n < m and w <m v then <n(w) = <n(v) (where <n(w) = {u : u <n w})
and,
3. if n < m then w <m v <n u implies that w <n u.
It will also be convenient to define some auxiliary relations. Say:
• w ≪n v if for some m ≥ n, w <m v and,
• w≪n v if w ≪n v or there is u ∈W such that w ≪n u and v ≪n+1 u.
By the above frame conditions it is easy to see that ≪n is transitive and well-
founded.
We will also use ≪n and ≪n to denote the respective reflexive closures.
Let ≈n denote the symmetric, reflexive, transitive closure of ≪n and let [w]n
denote the equivalence class of w under ≈n. Write [w]n+1 <n [v]n+1 if there
exist w′ ∈ [w]n+1, v
′ ∈ [v]n+1 such that w
′ <n v
′.
A J-frame W is said to be stratified if whenever [w]n+1 <n [v]n+1, it follows
that w <n v. Note that the property of being stratified in particular entails the
modally inexpressible frame condition that w <n v and w <m u implies u <n v
whenever m > n. With this we may state the following completeness result also
from [3]:
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Lemma 7.1. Any J-consistent formula can be satisfied on a finite, stratified
J-frame.
Thus if we can reduce GLPω to J, we will be able to work with finite well-
behaved Kripke models. For this, given a formula φ whose maximal modality
is N , define
M(φ) =
∧
[n]ψ∈sub(φ)
n<m≤N
[n]ψ → [m]ψ.
Then we set M+(φ) = M(φ) ∧
∧
n≤N [n]M(φ).
The following is also proven in [3]:
Lemma 7.2. For any formula φ ∈ Lω, GLPω ⊢ φ if and only if
J ⊢M+(φ)→ φ.
We shall use these results in the next section to prove arithmetical complete-
ness by “piggybacking” from the completeness of J for finite frames.
8 Completeness
In this section we want to prove that GLP≺ is complete for its ω-rule interpre-
tation. This means that, given a consistent formula φ, there is an arithmetic
interpretation f such that ¬f≺T (φ) is not derivable in T (we will make this claim
precise in Theorem 8.2).
There are many proofs of completeness of GL and GLPω, and it is possible to
go back to an existing proof and adjust it to prove completeness in our setting.
Because of this, we should say a few words about our choice of including a full
proof in this paper. There are essentially two reasons.
The first is that, while our result follows to a certain degree from known
proofs, it does not follow from known results; even then, there would be several
technical issues in adjusting known arguments to our setting, as they make
assumptions that are not available to us.
The second is that the argument we propose carries some simplifications
over previous proofs that could also be applied to standard interpretations of
GLPω, thus contributing to an ongoing effort to find simpler arguments for this
celebrated result.
To be more precise, there are at least six proofs in the literature:
1. Solovay originally constructed a function h with domain ω of a self-referen-
tial nature and used statements about h to prove the completeness theorem
for the unimodal GLP1 [12]. The proof used the recursion theorem.
2. De Jongh, Jumelet and Montagna introduced a modification using the
fixpoint theorem instead of the recursion theorem [7], where the function
h is simulated via finite sequences that represent computations [7]. This
approach is presented in greater detail in [6].
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3. A more elementary construction using the simultaneous fixpoint theorem
is also given in [7].
4. Japaridze proved completeness for GLPω with essentially the ω-rule inter-
pretation we are presenting here [10].
5. Ignatiev generalized this result to a large family of “strong provability
predicates” [9].
6. Beklemishev gave a simplified argument using the logic J, which is very
well-behaved. However, this proof still considers a family of N Solovay
functions hn with domain ω, where N is the number of modal operators
appearing in our “target formula” φ.
Despite these strong provability predicates being quite general, they do not
apply to our interpretation, as for example it is assumed that they are of increas-
ing logical complexity whereas our iterated provability operators are all given
by a single Π11 formula. The argument we present here, aside from being the fist
that considers aribtrary recursive well-orders, combines ideas from [7] and [4]
by considering finite paths over a polymodal J-frame. We do so by introducing
an additional trick, which is to work with all modalities simultaneously, where
our path makes a λn-step whenever appropriate. Readers familiar with known
proofs might find it surprising that this is not problematic, but indeed it isn’t
and otherwise the argument proceeds as in other settings. As always, we will
mimic a Kripke structure using arithmetic formulas and define our arithmetic
interpretation based on them.
Since GLP≺ is Kripke incomplete, we will resort to J-models instead. These
models are related to GLPω as described in the previous section. The step from
GLP≺ to GLPω is provided by the following easy lemma which is also given in
[5].
Lemma 8.1. Let φ be a GLP≺ formula whose occurring modalities in increasing
order are {λ0, . . . , λN}. By φ we denote the condensation of φ that arises by
simultaneously replacing each occurrence of [λi] by [i]. It now holds that
GLP≺ 0 φ =⇒ GLPω 0 φ.
Proof. Arguing by contrapositive, given a GLPω-derivation d of φ we may replace
every occurrence of [n] in d by [λn], thus obtaining a derivation of φ.
With this easy lemma at hand we may give an outline of the proof of our
completess theorem, which reads as follows.
Theorem 8.2. If ≺ is recursive, T is any sound, representable, ≺-introspective
theory extending ACA0 and proving wo(≺) and φ is any L[·]-formula, GLP≺ ⊢ φ
if and only if, for every arithmetical interpretation f , T≺ ⊢ f≺T (φ).
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Proof sketch. One direction is soundness and has already been established.
For the other, if GLP≺ 0 φ then by our above Lemma 8.1 combined with
Lemma 7.2, M+(φ) ∧ ¬φ is not provable in J.
Thus by Lemma 7.1, M+(φ) ∧ ¬φ can be satisfied on a world w∗ of some
J-model W′ = 〈W ′, 〈>n〉n<N , J·K〉 where W ′ = [1,M ] for some M ≥ 1. We
construct a new model W which is as W ′ only that now a new <0-maximal
root 0. The valuation of propositional letters on 0 is chosen arbitrarily and is
irrelevant.
The next ingredient is to assign to each w ∈ W an arithmetic sentence σw
so that the formulas σ are a “snapshot” of W. We will make this precise in
Definition 8.4, but let us outline the essential properties that we need from σ.
First, we need for the arithmetic interpretation f that sends a propositional
variable p to f(p) :=
∨
w∈JpK σw to have the property that
W, w  ψ ⇐⇒ T ⊢ σw → f
≺
T (ψ)
for each w ∈ W ′ and each subformula ψ of φ. In particular we have T ⊢ σw∗ →
¬f≺T (φ) from which we obtain
T ⊢ ♦Tσ1 → ¬T f
≺
T (φ). (8)
Our desired result will follow if the formulas σ satisfy two more properties: the
second is that
T ⊢ σ0 → ♦Tσ1,
and the third, that N |= σ0. By the assumption that T is sound we conclude
that N |= ¬T f
≺
T (φ). Hence, f
≺
T (φ) is not provable in T which is what was to
be shown.
Before we proceed to give the details needed to complete the proof we state
as an easy consequence of our arithmetic completeness theorem the following
lemma which was also proven by purely modal means in [5].
Corollary 8.3. Given a recursive well-order ≺ and an L[·]-formula φ we have
that
GLP≺ ⊢ φ ⇐⇒ GLPω ⊢ φ.
Proof. One direction is Lemma 8.1. For the other direction, suppose GLPω 0 φ.
By the proof of Theorem 8.2 we find an arithmetical interpretation f so that
ACA0
≺
0 f≺T (φ). By the soundness theorem (Thm. 6.7) we conclude that
GLP≺ 0 φ.
Before entering into further detail, we first say what it means that a collection
of sentences σ = {σ0, . . . , σk} is a snapshot of a Kripke structure with nodes
{0, . . . , k} inside a theory. Most importantly, this means that each world w will
be associated with an arithmetic sentence σw so that this sentence carries all
the important information in terms of accessible worlds.
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Definition 8.4. Given a sequence
λ = λ0 ≺ λ1 ≺ . . . ≺ λN−1,
a finite J-model W = 〈W, 〈<n〉n<N , J·K〉 with root 0, and a formal theory T , a
family of formulas {σw : w ∈W} is a λ-snapshot of W in T if
1. T ⊢
∧
w 6=v∈W
¬(σw ∧ σv),
2. T + σw ⊢ 〈λ¯n〉
≺
T σv for all n < N and v <n w,
3. for all n < N and for each world w 6= 0,
T + σw ⊢ [λ¯n]
≺
T
∨
v≪nw
σv
4. N |= σ0.
If W, σ, λ, T are as above we will write σ : W λ→֒≺ T.
Lemma 8.5. Suppose that σ : W λ→֒≺ T , φ is an L[·]-formula with modalities
amongst λ such that W |= M+(φ), and f(p) :=
∨
w∈JpK σw.
Then, for all 0 6= w ∈ W and every subformula ψ of φ,
1. if w ∈
q
ψ
y
then T + σw ⊢ f
≺
T (ψ)
2. if w 6∈
q
ψ
y
then T + σw ⊢ ¬f
≺
T (ψ)
Proof. By an easy induction on the complexity of ψ.
In the remainder of this section, we shall mainly see how to produce snap-
shots of a given Kripke model W in a theory T . We define the corresponding
sentences σw for w ∈ W in a standard way as limit statements of certain com-
putable Solovay functions.
One important notion in all known Solovay-style proofs, including our own,
is the notion of a “code for a ξ-derivation of φ.”
Definition 8.6. Let X be a set of natural numbers. A code of a 0-proof of φ
overX is any natural number m satisfying ProofT (m,φ). We assume that every
derivation proves a unique formula in our coding, and that this fact is derivable;
we also assume that every derivable formula has arbitrarily large derivations2.
For ξ ≻ 0, a triple 〈ζ, n,m〉 codes a ξ-derivation of φ over X if ξ ≻ ζ and
1. n = pψq for some ψ such that, given k < ω, [ζ]Xψ(k) and
2Usually, derivations are represented as sequences of formulas, and any given derivation
can be considered to only prove its last formula. Similarly, if derivations are represented as
trees, then only the root is considered to be proven. Moreover, in standard proof systems,
given a derivation d, there are ways to produce a longer derivation with the same end-formula;
for example, one may add many redundant copies of an axiom at the beginning of d.
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2. m is a code of a 0-proof of ∀xψ → φ.
Let ProofX(x, ξ, φ) be a formula stating that x = 〈ζ, ψ, d〉 codes a ξ-derivation
of φ over X.
Of course in ProofX the intention is for X to be an iterated provability
operator, and we may define
Proof≺T = ∀X(IPC
≺(X)→ ProofX).
Note that formula Proof≺T is of rather high complexity (Π
1
1) which is moreover
independent of ξ. However, the behavior of Proof≺T (x, ξ, φ) is simple in the eyes
of λ provability whenever λ < ξ, as is expressed in the next lemma.
Lemma 8.7. Let T be a theory extending ACA0. For ξ 4 λ we have
1. T
≺
⊢ ∀x∀ξ∀φ Proof≺T (x, ξ, φ)→ [λ]
≺
T Proof
≺
T (x˙, ξ˙, φ˙),
2. T
≺
⊢ ∀x∀ξ∀φ ¬Proof≺T (x, ξ, φ)→ [λ]
≺
T ¬Proof
≺
T (x˙, ξ˙, φ˙).
Proof. We prove the first item. We reason in T
≺
and assume Proof≺T (x, ξ, φ).
If ξ = 0, ProofT (d, φ) is ∆ˆ
0
1 so [0]XProofT (d, φ). So we assume ξ ≻ 0 whence
ProofT (d, ∀xψ(x)→ φ) is equivalent to
x = 〈ψ, µ, d〉 ∧ µ≺ξ ∧ ∀n[µ]≺T ψ(n) ∧ ProofT (d, ∀xψ(x) → φ). (9)
All conjuncts other than ∀n[µ]≺T ψ(n) are of complexity ∆ˆ
0
1 so they –as their
negations– all are 0-provable whence certainly λ-provable. By Lemma 6.4 we
obtain ∀n[µ]≺T ψ(n˙)→ ∀n[µ]
≺
T [µ˙]
≺
T ψ(n˙), and since µ ≺ λ we use one application
of the ω-rule to see that
∀n[µ]≺T ψ(n˙)→ [λ]
≺
T ∀n[µ˙]
≺
T ψ(n˙).
Since the [λ]≺T predicate is closed under conjunction we have the entire conjunc-
tion (9) under the scope of the [λ]≺T predicate which was to be shown.
The second item goes analogously now using Lemma 6.5 instead of 6.4.
8.1 Solovay sequences
Let us define a Solovay sequence or path; these sequences are given by a recursion
based on provability operators which depends on a parameter φ. Later we will
choose an appropriate value of φ via a fixpoint construction. We shall use the
following notation: Seq(x) is a ∆ˆ00 formula stating that x codes a sequence,
last(x) is a term that picks out the last element of x, x ⊑ y is a ∆ˆ00 formula
that states that x is an initial segment of y, |x| gives the length of x and xy
a term which picks the y-coordinate of x. As in previous sections, it is not
necessary to have these terms available in our language, as we can define their
graphs and replace them by pseudo-terms, but we shall write them as such for
simplicity of exposition.
We will also define a (pseudo) term Lim which gives a formula stating that
the paths satsifying φ “converge” to w:
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Definition 8.8. Define
Lim(φ,w) := ∃s
(
φ(s˙) ∧ ∀s′ ⊒ s φ(s˙′)→ last(s′) = w¯
)
.
We shall use these formulas to define our recursive paths.
Definition 8.9. Let W = 〈W, 〈<n〉n<N , J·K〉 be a Kripke frame and let λ =
〈λn〉n<N a finite sequence. We define a formula s : T
λ
 
X
W | φ by
s : T λ 
X
W | φ :=
Seq(s) ∧ last(s) 6= 0
∧∀x<|s| − 1
∧
w∈W
(
sx = w¯ →
( ∧
n<N
∧
v<nw
¬ProofX(x, λn,¬Lim(φ, v)
)
→ sx+1 = w¯
∧
( ∨
n<N
∨
v<nw
ProofX(x, λn,¬Lim(φ, v)
)
→ sx+1 = v¯
)
.
We then set s : T λ ≺ W | φ = ∀X
(
IPC≺T (X)→ s : T
λ
 
X
W | φ
)
.
We should remark that s,X, φ are variables and λ,W are external parame-
ters so that we are in fact defining a family of formulas. With this we can say
what it means to be a Solovay path.
Definition 8.10 (Solovay path). We define a Solovay path to be any natural
number s satisfying the formula s : T λ ≺ W defined using the fixpoint theorem
on the parameter φ in s : T λ ≺ W | φ, so that
ACA0 ⊢ s : T
λ
 ≺ W ↔
(
s˙ : T λ ≺ W | px : T
λ
 ≺ Wq
)
.
Further, we say w is a Solovay value at i if
w ≃ {T λ ≺ W}i := ∃s
(
s : T λ ≺ W ∧ |s| > i ∧ si = w
)
holds, and w is a limit Solovay value if it satisfies
w ≃ Lim{T λ ≺ W} := Lim
(
px : T λ ≺ Wq, w
)
.
The following shows that Solovay values in fact define a function.
Lemma 8.11. If U extends ACA0, T is any representable theory, W is a J-
frame and λ a ≺-increasing sequence, it is derivable in U that
1. ∀s∀s′(s : T λ ≺ W ∧ s
′ : T λ ≺ W→ s ⊑ s
′ ∨ s′ ⊑ s)
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2. ∀I∃s s : T λ ≺ W ∧ |s| > I
3. ∀i∃!w w ≃ {T λ ≺ W}i and
4. ∀s∀j < i v¯ ≃ {T λ ≺ W}j ∧ w¯ ≃ {T
λ
 ≺ W}i → w¯≪0 v¯.
Proof.
1 Clearly it suffices to prove that(
(s : T λ 
X
W | φ) ∧ (s′ : T λ 
X
W | φ) ∧ i < |s| ∧ i < |s′|
)
→ si = s
′
i,
for then if s, s′ are any two paths and, say, |s| ≤ |s′|, it follows that si = s
′
i for
all i < |s| and thus s ⊑ s′. Moreover, this formula is arithmetic and hence we
may proceed by induction on i.
The base case is trivial since s0 = s
′
0 = 0. For the inductive step, we assume
w = si = s
′
i. Then, we must have that either ProofX(i, λn,¬Lim, φ, v¯)) holds for
some v, n, or it does not. If it does, then the value of v is uniquely determined (as
i may be the code of a derivation of only one formula) and thus si+1 = s
′
i+1 = v.
Otherwise,
∧
n
∧
v<nw
¬ProofX(x, λn,¬Lim(φ, v¯)) holds and si+1 = s
′
i+1 = w.
Once again the claim follows by introducing universal quantifiers over X and φ.
2 The proof follows the above structure; here we observe that if s is a Solo-
vay path, we may always add one additional element to s depending on which
condition is met.
3 This is immediate from items 1 and 2.
4 By the recursive definition of a Solovay path, it is always the case that
sj+1 ≪0 sj . Since ≪0 is transitive, this implies inductively that si ≪0 sj
whenever j < i, and this induction can be easily formalized in U .
Lemma 8.12. Let W be a finite J-frame and λ a ≺-increasing sequence. Sup-
pose further that U extends ACA0, ≺ is recursive and T is representable and
≺-introspective, w ∈W and n ≤ N . Then,
U≺ ⊢ w¯ ≃ {T λ ≺ W}k
→ [λn]
≺
T
∧
v∈W
v¯ ≃ {T λ ≺ W}k˙ → v¯ ≈n+1 w¯.
Further,
U≺ ⊢ m ≤ n ∧ u¯ >m w¯
∧ u¯ ≃ {T λ ≺ W}k ∧ w¯ ≃ {T
λ
 ≺ W}k+1
→ [λn]
≺
T
∧
v∈W
w¯ ≃ {T λ ≺ W}k˙.
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Proof. Reasoning within U , we will prove both claims simultaneously. To be
precise, we show by induction on k that
IPC≺(X) ∧ s : T λ 
X
W | px : T λ ≺ Wq ∧ |s| > k→∧
w∈W
sk = w → [λn]X∀x x : T
λ
 ≺ W ∧ |x| > k → xk ≈n+1 w
∧
∧
m<n
sk >m w → [λn]X∀x x : T
λ
 ≺ W ∧ |x| > i→ xi+1 = w.
Case 1. Suppose that w <m sk for some m ≤ n. Then, k codes a λm-
derivation of w 6≃ Lim{T λ ≺ W}, and by Lemma 8.7.1,
[λn]XProof
≺
T
(
k¯, λ¯m, w 6≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W}
)
.
Meanwhile, for v = sk, by our induction hypothesis
[λn]X(x : T
λ
 ≺ W ∧ |x| > k → xk ≈n+1 v),
but xk ≈n+1 v <m w provably implies that xk <m w by the J-frame conditions
and thus
[λn]X∀x
(
x : T λ ≺ W ∧ |x| > k¯ + 1→ xk¯+1 = w
)
.
The claim follows by quantifying over all X .
Case 2. Suppose that for no m ≤ n do we have that sk+1 <m sk; then as in
Case 1 we have that w <m xk if and only if w <m sk and by Lemma 8.7.2 we
have for each such w and m that
[λn]
≺
T ¬Proof
≺
T
(
k¯, λ¯m, w¯ 6≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W}
)
.
Thus in view of Lemma 8.11.4 and the previous case we must have that
xk+1 ≪n+1 xk
IH
≈n+1 sk ≫n+1 sk+1,
which by definition implies that xk+1 ≈n+1 sk+1. Formalizing this reasoning
within T , it follows that
[λn]X∀x
(
x : T λ ≺ W ∧ |x| > k¯ + 1→ xk¯+1 ≈n+1 w¯
)
,
and once again we conclude the original claim by quantifying over X .
From here on, it remains to show that the formulas w¯ ≃ Lim{T λ ≺ W} give
a snapshot of our Kripke model.
Lemma 8.13. If U extends ACA0, ≺ is recursive and T is representable and
≺-introspective, m < n < N and v <m w then
U + w¯ ≃ Lim{T λ ≺ W} ⊢ 〈λn〉
≺
T v ≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W}.
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Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose that
[λn]
≺
T v 6≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W}.
It follows that [λn]
≺
T v 6≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W}, and hence there exists some i
which satisfies Proof≺T
(
i, λn, v 6≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W}
)
. Now, by assumption w ≃
Lim{T λ ≺ W} holds, and hence we may choose s such that Last(s
′) = w for
all s′ ⊒ s. Recall that we assumed that every derivable formula has arbitrarily
large derivations (see Definition 8.6), and thus we may pick i > |s| such that
Proof≺T
(
i, λn, v 6≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W}
)
holds and, in view of Lemma 8.11.2, a Solovay path s′ with |s′| > i+ 1. Then,
s′i = s
′
i+1 = w, but by the Solovay recursion we should have s
′
i+1 = v, a
contradiction.
Lemma 8.14. If U, T extend ACA0, ≺ is recursive and T is representable and
≺-introspective, w 6= 0 and n ≤ N then
U≺ + w¯ ≃ Lim{T λ ≺ W} ⊢ [λn]
≺
T
∨
v≪nw
v¯ ≃ Lim{T λ ≺ W}.
Proof. We reason in U≺ + w¯ ≃ Lim{T λ ≺ W}. Let s be a Solovay path with
with w = Last(s). Let k∗ < |s| be the greatest value such that sk∗ <n sk∗−1 if
there is such a value; otherwise set k∗ = 0.
By Lemma 8.12,
[λn]
≺
T
(
∀x x : T λ ≺ W ∧ |x| > k∗ → xk¯∗ = s¯k∗
)
. (10)
Moreover, by Lemma 8.13 we have that 〈λm〉
≺
T v¯ ≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W} so that by
Lemma 6.5 we also have
[λn]
≺
T
∧
m<n
∧
v<mw
〈λ¯m〉
≺
T v¯ ≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W},
from which it follows using Lemma 8.11.4 that
[λn]
≺
T ∀x k¯∗ < j ∧ x : T
λ
 ≺ W ∧ |x| > j → xj ≪n xk¯∗ . (11)
Putting (10) and (11) together, along with the fact that sk∗ ≫n+1 w we see
that
[λn]
≺
T ∀x x : T
λ
 ≺ W ∧ |x| > k¯∗ → Last(x)≪n w.
It remains to disprove the case that Last(x) = w. For this, choose the least
value of k such that sk+1 = w; note that this value is well-defined since s0 = 0.
It then follows that Proof≺T (k, λn, w 6≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W}), and in view of Lemma
8.7.1 the latter clearly implies that [λn]
≺
T w¯ 6≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W}, as required.
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We are now ready to prove that w ≃ Lim{T λ ≺ W} provide a snapshot of
our J-model.
Lemma 8.15. Let T be any sound, ≺-introspective theory extending ACA0.
Given a finite J-frame W with root 0 and any ≺-increasing sequence λ set
−−→
Lim{T λ ≺ W} =
〈
w¯ ≃ Lim{T λ ≺ W} : w ∈W
〉
.
Then,
−−→
Lim{T λ ≺ W} : W
λ
→֒≺ T.
Proof. We must check each of the conditions of Definition 8.4.
1 For the first, suppose that w ≃ Lim{T λ ≺ W} and v ≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W} hold.
In view of w ≃ Lim{T λ ≺ W}, pick a Solovay path s such that any extension
of s has last element w and similarly s′ such that any extension of s′ has last
element v. By Lemma 8.11.1, either s ⊒ s′ or s′ ⊒ s; in either case, it follows
by w ≃ Lim{T λ ≺ W} ∧ v ≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W} that w = v.
2-3 The second condition is Lemma 8.13 and the third, Lemma 8.14.
4 For the fourth, we must use the fact that [λ]≺T is sound for all λ and proceed
by induction on ≪0 to show that, if s is a Solovay path and w 6= 0, then si 6= 0
for all i. For indeed, if si = w 6= 0 for some i, picking the minimal such i we
see that i codes a λn-derivation of w¯ 6≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W}; hence, by soundness we
must have that, for some s′ ⊒ s, last(s′) 6= w. But then, by Lemma 8.11.4,
last(s′) = v ≪0 w, but by induction on v ≪0 w there can be no such path.
We conclude that any Solovay path is identically zero, so that the formula
0¯ ≃ Lim{T λ ≺ W} is true.
We may finally prove our main completeness result.
Proof of Theorem 8.2. We have already seen that the logic is sound.
For the other, if φ is consistent over GLP≺, then by Lemma 7.2, M
+(φ) ∧ φ
is consistent over J and thus by Lemma 7.1, M+(φ¯) ∧ φ¯ can be satisfied on a
world w∗ of some stratified J-model W
′. Define W by adding 0 as a root to W′
and let λ be the modalities appearing in φ. By Lemma 8.15,
−−→
Lim{T λ ≺ W} : W
λ
→֒≺ T
so that by Lemma 8.5.1,
T≺ + w∗ ≃ Lim{T
λ
 ≺ W} ⊢ f
≺
T (φ).
Hence, by lemma 8.5.2, N |= ♦T f
≺
T (φ), i.e. f
≺
T (φ) is consistent over T .
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A Alternative provability predicates
In this section we shall briefly discuss some variants of our provability predicates.
We do so in an informal setting and in particular shall refer to defining recursions
rather than formalizations in second order logic. Moreover, we shall on occasion
not be too concerned about the amount of transfinite induction needed in the
arguments.
We could consider an apparently slightly weaker notion of α provability –
let us write [α]≺,wT – defined by the following recursion:
[α]≺,wT φ :⇔ Tφ ∨ ∃ψ ∃β≺α(∀n [β]
≺,w
T ψ(n) ∧ [β]
≺,w
T (∀xψ(x)→ φ)).
However, it is easy to see by transfinite induction that [α]≺,wT φ ⇔ [α]
≺
T φ.
The ⇐ direction is obvious. For the other direction we assume that we can
formalize the notion of [α]≺,wT just like [α]
≺
T and prove all the necessary lem-
mata like monotonicity, distribution axioms, etc. Suppose that ∀n [β]≺,wT ψ(n)∧
[β]≺,wT (∀xψ(x)→ φ) for some formula ψ and ordinal β ≺ α. Then, clearly also
∀n [β]≺,wT
(
ψ(n)∧(∀xψ(x) → φ)
)
. But, as [0]≺T
(
(∀xψ(x)∧(∀xψ(x) → φ))→ φ
)
we get
∀n [β]≺,wT
(
ψ(n) ∧ (∀xψ(x)→ φ)
)
∧ [0]
(
(∀xψ(x) ∧ (∀xψ(x)→ φ))→ φ
)
which by the induction hypothesis for β is just [α]≺T φ.
Note that in our definition of [α]≺T there is still some uniformity present in
that we choose one particular β ≺ α with [β]≺T ψ(n) for all numbers n. We can
make this β also dependent on n. In a sense, this boils down to diagonalizing
at limit ordinals. Thus, we define our notion of [α]≺,dT as follows:
[α]≺,dT φ :⇔ Tφ ∨ ∃ψ
(
∀n ∃βn≺α
(
[βn]
≺,d
T ψ(n) ∧ (∀xψ(x)→ φ)
))
.
By an argument similar as before, we see that, also in this notion we can re-
place the (∀xψ(x) → φ) by ∃ γ≺α [γ]≺,dT (∀xψ(x) → φ) without losing any
strength. This new notion of provability is related to [α]≺T in a simple fashion as
is expressed in Lemma A.2 below. Again, we assume that we can formalize the
notion [α]≺,dT in a suitable way so that the basic properties are provable. We
first state a simple but useful observation.
Lemma A.1.
1. [α+ 1]≺T φ ⇔ ∃ψ
(
∀n [α]≺T ψ(n) ∧ (∀xψ(x)→ φ)
)
2. [α+ 1]≺,dT φ ⇔ ∃ψ
(
∀n [α]≺,dT ψ(n) ∧ (∀xψ(x)→ φ)
)
Proof. This follows directly from the definition and monotonicity.
Lemma A.2.
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1. [n]≺T φ ⇔ [n]
≺,d
T φ for n ∈ ω;
2. [α+ 1]≺T φ ⇔ [α]
≺,d
T φ for α < ω.
Proof. The proofs proceed by induction on n and α, respectively, and we omit
them.
As can be seen, there is a fair amount of freedom in defining transfinite
iterations of the ω-rule. We chose the current paper’s presentation both for the
sake of simplicity and because a more refined hierarchy is in general terms more
convenient; after all, it is easy to remove intermediate operators later if they
are not needed. We also suspect it will be the appropriate notion useful later
for a Π01-ordinal analysis of second-order arithmetics, a goal which now seems
well within our reach.
B An afterword on the choice of our base theory
In this paper we have shown sound and completeness of the logic GLP≺ for the
interpretation where each [ξ] modality is interpreted as “provable in ACA0 using
at most ξ nested applications of the omega-rule”. The main applications we
have in mind with this result is to provide Π01 ordinal analyses of theories much
stronger than PA in the style of Beklemishev ([1]). For the mere soundness of
the logic however, there were quite some strong principles needed: the existence
of an iterated provability class, plus a certain amount of transfinite induction.
We shall discuss here how these principles fit into the intended application of
ordinal analyses.
A consistency proof of U in Elementary Arithmetic (EA) plus TI(Πˆ01,≺)
(using a natural ordinal notation system for large enough ordinals) is closely
related to the Π01 ordinal analysis of U and we shall focus our discussion on
such a consistency proof. Such a consistency proof can be seen as a partial
realization of Hilbert’s program in the sense that over finitsitic mathematics
one can prove the consistency of a strong theory with just one additional non-
finitist ingredient. As such one could say that U is safeguarded by this method.
If one accepts this method of safeguarding it makes philosophically speaking
sense that one may use U itself as new base theory to safeguard even stronger
theories by the same method. It is in this perspective that having ACA0 as our
base theory is not a bad thing since ACA0 has already been safeguarded over
EA using some amount of transfinite induction. However, for technical reasons
it might be desirable to dispense with such an intermediate step.
In [11] it is noted that soundness of GLP≺ suffices to perform a consistency
proof and completeness is actually not needed. But also in the soundness proof
presented in this paper we needed transfinite induction as well as resorting to
the introspective closure of a theory. However, as we have seen in Corollary 5.8,
for the sake of consistency-strength it is irrelevant to consider either a theory
or its introspective closure as both theories are provably equiconsistent. Thus,
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to conclude, let us consider the amount of transfinite induction needed in our
soundness proof of GLP≺.
First of all, let us note that our soundness proof of GLP≺ uses at most
TI(Π01,≺). In a sense, this is not bad at all, because it is exactly this ingredient
(in parameter free form) that is added EA to perform a consistency proof of
our target theory. So, by adding this amount of transfinite induction (with
parameters) to EA, we get access to exactly the soundness of GLP≺ needed to
perform this consistency proof, were it not for the case that our base theory was
taken to be ACA0, not EA. This choice of ACA0 has been mainly to simplify
our exposition and the needed amount of arithmetic can be pushed down a lot
further.
We observed that to prove TI(Π01,≺) over EA
≺ we need Σ01 comprehen-
sion. But clearly Σ01 comprehension with second order parameters proves ACA0.
However, close inspection of the proofs in our paper shows that the only free
set-parameters needed are occurrences of iterated provability classes. Thus if
we enrich our language with a constant π with an axiom stating that π is an
iterated provability class (see Lemma 5.10), we can do with parameter free
comprehension since then TI(Πˆ01,≺) suffices.
However, we can do better still in the sense that we need less comprehension
by allowing slightly stronger well-ordering assumptions as we shall see in the
next lemma.
Let us fix some bijective coding of α on the naturals, and let ≺ be a primitive
recursive well-order on α. Let < denote the usual ordering on the natural
numbers. Using a bijective pairing function we define a new relation
〈ξ, n〉 ≺′ 〈ζ,m〉 := ξ ≺ ζ ∨ (ξ = ζ ∧ n < m).
Clearly, ≺′ provably defines a relation of order type ω · α. With this notation
we can now state our lemma.
Lemma B.1. ∆ˆ00-CA+ wo(ω · α) ⊢ TI(Πˆ
0
1, α).
Proof. By the usual argument we see that ∆ˆ00-CA + wo(ω · α) ⊢ TI(∆ˆ
0
0, ω · α).
Thus, we shall proof TI(Πˆ01, α) using TI(∆ˆ
0
0, ω · α). Let ϕ(z, x) be some ∆ˆ
0
0
formula and assume
∀x (∀ y≺x ∀zϕ(z, y)→ ∀zϕ(z, x)). (12)
If we assume that ∀ y≺′x ϕ(y1, y0), using (12) we get ϕ(x1, x0) whence by
TI(∆ˆ00, ω · α) we obtain ∀x∀zϕ(z, x).
Note that ω · α is not much larger than α. In particular, if the last term in
CNF of α is at least ωω we get that ω ·α = α. Thus, for natural proof theoretical
ordinals we have this equation whence we get the extra induction for free.
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